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SOCIAL SECURITY ENCOUNTERS COMMON-LAW
MARRIAGE IN NORTH CAROLINA*
JAMES P. LYNch**
Introduction
Since the early days of 1937 the problems attendant on that ancient
trouble-maker, common-law marriage, have been a very real concern to
those persons in Washington and elsewhere who are administering the
Social Security Act.' At first glance this condition may seem sur-
prising in the face of the small number of decisions dealing with such
marriages in the jurisdictions which permit them.2 However, further
analysis will explain this sparsity of appellate court opinions in the
common-law marriage field.
Obviously most of the reported decisions involving common-law
marriages concern property disputes which arise after the death of one
of the parties-usually the husband. And, unless the amount of prop-
erty justifies litigation (a condition rarely present in the stratum of so-
ciety which finds common-law unions attractive), nothing will be gained
by bringing into the open a relationship contracted without the formal
blessing of either church or state. Consequently, when a common-law
marriage does exist, its creation, existence, and eventual dissolution by
death or otherwise may go unnoticed by all save those intimately asso-
ciated with the couple in question. Even dissolution by death rarely
provokes litigation for the simple reason that the "estate" of the average
common-law spouse is frequently non-existent.
Today, however, a new order of events is emerging which will make
common-law marriage a more frequent actor on the legal stage, except
in those jurisdictions where such unions have been wholly inhibited by
statute. The common-law spolse, who yesterday would have died pen-
niless, today because of the Social Security Act will leave an estate
which soon will justify litigating the validity of his alleged marriage.3
* All opinions expressed in this article are those of the author as an individual
only. They are in no sense binding upon either the Social Security Board or the
office of the General Counsel to that Board. The author is indebted to Mr.
Leonard Calhoun and Mr. Thomas Clifford Billig, Assistant General Counsel and
Senior Attorney to the Board, respectively, for valuable suggestions in the prepa-
ration of this manuscript.
** Member of the bar, Supreme Court of Alabama and Supreme Court of the
United States; Claims Attorney, office of the General Counsel, Social Security
Board.
149 STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §§301-1305 (Supp. 1937).2Very few cases involving common-law marriages have reached the highest
state courts. These figures are typical: Alabama, 16; Florida, 11; Georgia, 13;
Iowa, 13; Minnesota, 11; South Carolina, 8; South Dakota, 4.
' Provided his or her occupation is not one of the following employments which
are excluded (49 STAT. 620, 625 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §410(b) (Supp. 1937))
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Under the Social Security Act every one of the millions of wage-
earners4 in covered employments who dies before the age of sixty-five
will leave a claim to a federal death payment.6 Moreover, many of
those who live beyond sixty-five and actually participate in monthly
benefits will die shortly after reaching that age and also leave claims to
death payments.6 And a vast number of persons now covered by the
Act will work long enough to make these federal payments, in either
case, a considerable sum, even though their monthly earnings may be
small.
Such being the situation, the question naturally arises, who will re-
ceive these benefits payable on the death of the wage-earner? Congress,
in the Social Security Act, named "the estate" of the deceased wage-
earner as the payeer and also enacted, in Section 205 thereof, that:
"If any amount payable to an estate under section 203 or 204 is
$500 or less, such amount may, under regulations prescribed by the
Board, -be paid to the persons found by the Board to be entitled thereto
under the law of the State in which the deceased was domiciled, without
the necessity of compliance with the requirements of law with respect to
the administration of such estate."8
Accordingly, where the applicant for a death benefit alleges that she
is the legal widow (or legal widower in case the applicant is a husband)
from the operation of the Act: (1) Agricultural labor; (2) domestic service in a
private home; (3) casual labor not in the course of the employer's trade or
business; (4) service as an officer or seaman on an American or foreign vessel;
(5) employment by the United States or an instrumentality thereof or (6) by
a state, political subdivisions thereof, or instrumentalities of a state or states
or their political subdivisions; (7) service in the employment of exclusively re-
ligious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational organizations not operated
for private profit.
'The Social Security Board has received, as of January 31, 1938, 37,349,905
applications for social security account numbers. This figure does not include
576,381 void applications.
'The Act (49 STAT. 620, 623 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §403(a) (Supp. 1937))
provides, in substance, that there shall be paid to the estate of an individual who
dies before attaining the age of sixty-five, an amount equal to three and one-half
per centum of the total wages earned by such person after December 31, 1936.
In the event that death occurs after some benefits have been received, the
estate will be paid the difference between what the deceased received and the
three and one-half per centum (49 STAT. 620, 624 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §§403(b,
c) (Supp. 1937)). To receive old-age insurance benefits under the Act during his
lifetime, the recipient must be a "qualified individual", i.c., he must be at least
sixty-five years of age; he must have earned not less than $2,000 in wages in a
covered employment before attaining that age and after December 31, 1936, during
five calendar years (49 STAT. 620, 625 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §410(c) (Supp.
1937)). Wages means "all remuneration for employment, including the cash value
of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term
shall not include that part of the remuneration which, after remuneration equal to
$3,000 has been paid to an individual by an employer with respect to employment
during any calendar year, is paid to such individual by such employer with re-
spect to employment during such calendar year." 49 STAT. 620, 625 (1935), 42
U. S. C. A. §410(a) (Supp. 1937).
749 STAT. 620, 623 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §403 (Supp. 1937).
849 STAT. 620, 624 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §405 (Supp. 1937).
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of the deceased wage-earner because of a common-law marriage, the
Board must make two findings, both dependent on state laz, before
certification can be made directly under Section 205. These findings
are (1) that the law of the particular state recognizes common-law mar-
riage and (2) that the applicant has met the conditions prescribed by
the law of that state for establishing herself as the common-law spouse.
If the allegation of marriage is premised on acts occurring outside the
domiciliary state, additional complications appear.
Such is the background to the problem which is the thesis of this
article. Experience already has demonstrated to the Social Security
Board that in many cases applications for benefits under Section 205
are premised on the alleged existence of a common-law marriage. At
the present time lump-sum death payments are in most cases very small
and, consequently, the ascertainment of the legal position of common-
law spouses in the fifty-one jurisdictions9 is usually the task of the
Social Security Board. However, in the near future when death pay-
ments become larger, this problem will confront courts and lawyers up
and down the land. The question of the validity of common-law mar-
riage in North Carolina already has arisen in connection with applica-
tions filed from that state. A review of the North Carolina cases is
therefore of immediate interest.
Common-Law Marriage Generally
As an introduction to the specific question to be considered, some
remarks of a general nature regarding the subject of common-law mar-
riage are believed appropriate.
The decisions generally agree that a common-law marriage is a
marriage entered into by contract only, without solemnization in any of
the forms generally required by either church or state. Such unions
are of two types: (a) iper verba de futuro cum copula and (b) per
verba de praesenti. The former class is virtually extinct ° as a result
of either adverse decisions," or statutes repudiating common-law mar-
'Title II of the Act applies to employment within the United States (49 STAT.
620, 625 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §410(b) (Supp. 1937)) which includes the forty-
eight states, Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia. 49 STAT. 620, 647
(1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §1301(a)(2) (Supp. 1937).
"At least two authorities state that there is no decision in the United States
that de futuro marriages are valid. MADDEN, PERSONS AND Domnsric RELATIONS
(1931) 58; JAcoBs, CAsEs ON DoMEsTic RELATIONs (1933) 399n. See also
L. R. A. 1915E 33, and the cases cited in 38 C. J. 1319, 1320, §94, n. 43, 45.
MADDEN, op. cit. supra, states that the true doctrine is that an agreement to
marry in the future, followed by copula, is at b st only prima facie evidence of
marriage, and that the prima facie case may be rebutted by evidence, circum-
stantial or otherwise, tending to show that there was no present intent or agree-
ment at the time of the copula to consummate a marriage or to convert the
executory agreement into a present actual marriage.
I See, for example, In re Danikas' Estate, 76 Colo. 191, 194, 230 Pac. 608, 609(1924) ; Marsicano v. Marsicano, 79 Fla. 278, 289, 84 So. 156, 160 (1920) ; In re
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riages generally.12 De praesenti marriages, ie., marriages resulting from
a present, mutual consent to be husband and wife, are of two classes:
those based on express contract and those resting on implied con-
tract.'3 The fundamental problem in the case of marriage by express
contract is whether or not subsequent cohabitation in the marital rela-
tion' 4 is necessary to a valid union.' 5 Alleged marriages based on im-
plied contracts present this question: Do the various incidents of the
cohabitation, the "habit and repute" of marriage, justify the inference
of a contract in the absence of an express oral or written agreement?
However, these are subordinate matters, to be considered after it has
Svendsen's Estate, 37 S. D. 353, 367, 158 N. W. 410, 414 (1916); Salvini v.
Salvini, et al., 2 S. W. (2d) 963, 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
1ARIz. REV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §2170; JONES ILL. STAT. ANN.
(1935) §78.04; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) §2977. S. D. CoiP. LAWS (1929) §102,
defines marriage as a "personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which the
consent of parties capable of making it is necessary. Consent alone will not
constitute marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by a mutual as-
sumption of marital rights, duties, or obligations." This validates marriages per
verba de praesenti. In re Svendsen's Estate, 37 S. D. 353, 367, 158 N. W. 410,
414 (1916). Section 105, by requiring the consent to be to a marriage com-
mencing instantly, and not to an agreement to marry afterwards, invalidates de
futuro marriages. In re Svendsen's Estate, supra.
" . Every marriage must be by contract, express or implied; that is, the
relation of husband and wife must be assumed, as such, by mutual consent."
Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 602, 153 S. W. 1124, 1126, L. R. A. 1915E 8
(1913). Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 336, 69 N. W. 31, 34 (1896), another
leading case, declared that it was "mutual, present consent, lawfully expressed,
which makes the marriage." See also Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124, 126 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1902) ; United States v. Dorto, 5 F. (2d) 596, 597 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) ;
2 ScHour.ER, MAP., Div., SEP., A" Dom. Rn. (6th ed. 1921), §1171. et seq.;
KIsZER, MAnR. AND Div. (2d ed. 1923) §73. See (1914) 27 'HARv. L. Ray. 378
on the general subject of the requisites and proof of common-law marriages.
"Cohabitation in any other relation is insufficient. "The evidence must support
a matrimonial cohabitation, as distinguished from a meretricious one." Arnold v.
Chesebrough, 58 Fed. 833, 835 (C. C. A. 2d, 1893), cert. denied 154 U. S. 493
(1893). See also In re Callery's Estate, 226 Pa. 469, 472; 75 At. 672, 673
(1910) ; Clancy v. Clancy, 66 Mich. 202, 206, 33 N. W. 889, 891 (1887) ; Griffin
v. Griffin et al., 225 Mich. 253, 257, 196 N. W. 384, 385 (1923).
" Billing and Lynch, Common-Law Marriage: A Problem of Social Se-
curity (1938) 22 MiNN. L. Rxv. 177; Note (1919) 3 Minn. L. Rev. 426. Grigsby
v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 602, 153 S. W. 1124, 1126, L. R. A. 1915E 1, 3 (1913),
criticizes both the doctrine and the cases denying the necessity of cohabitation
as an element of common-law marriage. There is a sharp conflict among the
states as to whether or not cohabitation is an element prerequisite to a valid
common-law marriage. For example, Alabama [White v. White, 225 Ala. 155,
142 So. 524 (1932) ; Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 69 So. 885 (1915)], Mississippi
[Jones et al. v. Lamensdorf et al., 175 Miss. 565, 167 So. 624 (1936)], South
Dakota [In re Svendsen's Estate, 37 S. D. 353, 158 N. W. 410 (1916)], and
Texas [Grigsby v. Reib, supra] do require cohabitation in the marital relation;
Minnesota [Billig and Lynch, supra] and Missouri [Davis v. Stouffer, 132 Mo.
App. 555, 112 S. W. 282 (1908)] do not. One weakness in the former rule is
the period of time which must elapse before the marital status is fixed. Carried
to an extreme, the effect is to require sexual relations before the matrimonial
relationship is legally established, a result defeating the real purpose of the mar-
riage laws. See note, L. R. A. 1915E 24-25, and MADDEN, PERsoNs AND Do Es-
TIC RLATIONS (1931) 61-62.
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been determined that the particular state recognizes common-law mar-
riage. Is North Carolina one of them?
Common-Law Marriage in North Carolina
American commentators agree almost unanimously that common-
law marriages are invalid in North Carolina.16 The authority for this
opinion is a line of cases of which State v. Wilson 17 is the most recent
and most frequently cited. The case involved an appeal by one defend-
ant who had been convicted of conspiring with several other defendants
to procure certain women to have carnal intercourse with them by
means of fraudulent marriages. The "marriage" consisted of a mock
ceremony performed by an unauthorized person. The conviction was
reversed and a new trial granted because of the lack of sufficient evi-
dence in the record. The defendant urged, in arrest of the judgment,
that no offense was charged, because, despite the fraud, a valid marriage
resulted from the consents given at the sham ceremony. This theory
of the defense was thus answered in the opinion :18
"... It was urged that consent makes marriage, and, therefore,
though the person solemnizing it was neither 'an ordained minister or a
Justice of the Peace,' (nor was the marriage according to the customs
" See I VERNRlt, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1931) 107, and the several au-
thorities there cited; MAY, MAPIAGE LAWS AND DEcIsIONs IN THE UNi rrz
STATES (1929) 320; 38 C. J. 1316, n. 3.
The North Carolina statute [N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§2493-2505]
does not expressly invalidate common-law marriage. It (§2493) would seem to
do no more than name the persons who may create a marriage and the manner in
which they are to perform their office, being in the same category as similar
statutes in other jurisdictions which have not been construed to invalidate com-
mon-law marriages in the absence of express words of nullity, i.e., words of
nullity requiring no construction. The statute (§2493) is aimed at marriage by
an unauthorized person, for marriage without a license is valid, although its
solemnization is unlawful (§2493), the officer performing it being liable for a pen-
alty (§2499). State v. Robbins, 28 N. C. 23, 25 (1845); State v. Parker, 106
N. C. 711, 713, 11 S. E. 517, 518 (1890); Maggett v. Roberts, 112. N. C. 71,
74, 16 S. E. 919, 920 (1893); Wooley v. Bruton, 184 N. C. 438, 440, 114 S.
E. 628, 629 (1922). It was said in note L. R. A. 1915E 114, that the courts
have consistently upheld marriages contracted according to the principles of
the common law where the statutes made provision "in the ordinary form for
license, authority of celebrant, manner of solemnization, certificate, registra-
tion, and the like." However, it was pointed out (at p. 118) that North Caro-
lina was among the jurisdictions in which a contrary' conclusion was reached
being influenced by certain colonial statutes. It should be noted here that in
Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76, 79, (1877), it was said, obiter, that although
statutes of the type under consideration were generally construed as directory,
North Carolina was a notable exception. This fact the court explained by
pointing out that "the statute contained a provision declaring null and void
all marriages solemnized as directed, without a license first had." (Italics
supplied.) The statement seems to conflict with State v. Robbins and State v.
Parker, supra.
For a general discussion of the effect of marriage statutes on common-law
marriages, see notes (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N.s.) 353, L. R. A. 1915E 113. See
also (1925) 39 A. L. R. 538; (1929) 60 A. L. R. 541.
"121 N. C. 650, 28 S. E. 416 (1897).
'Id. at 655, 28 S. E. at 418.
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of the Society of Friends), as provided in The Code, Section 1812, it
would be a valid marriage. Such is not the law in North Carolina.
Consent is essential to marriage, but it is not the only essential. 14 Am.
and Eng. Enc., 472, note 3. In this State it must be acknowledged in
the manner, and before some person, prescribed by the Section of The
Code just cited. No celebration was required -by the Canon Law prior
to the Council of Trent, nor by the Civil Law, nor by the law in Scot-
land, nor in many States of this Union. In some States the question
has never been decided. In other States celebration before some person
authorized by law is held essential, as (after some hesitation) has been
held to be the common law in England. Stewart Marriage & Div.,
Section 90; 14 Am. & Eng. Eric., 515. In the latter class is North
Carolina.
"There is no such thing as marriage simply by consent, in this State.
Ruffin, C. J., in State v. Samuel, 19 N. C., 177, and State v. Bray, 35
N. C., 290; Gaston, J., in State v. Patterson, 24 N. C., 346; Pearson, C.
J., in Cooke v. Cooke, 61 N. C., 583, and the same is recognized as the
law in the more recent cases of State v. Parker, 106 N. C., 711, and
State v. Mellon, 120 N. C., 591. .. .
The court then reviewed the discussion of the history of North
Carolina marriage laws set out in the Bray case,19 and stated in con-
clusion :20
"From this summary, it may be seen that a marriage pretendedly
celebrated before a person not authorized would be a nullity, and a con-
spiracy to procure a woman to submit herself to the embraces of a man
by false and fraudulent representations that the officiating person had
authority to solemnize the rites of matrimony would be a conspiracy to
do an unlawful act, and indictable. .. ."
It is unfortunate that the Wilson case does not present a factual
situation which would more definitely constitute a real common-law
marriage. As it is, only by its language does the case indicate that com-
mon-law marriages are not recognized in North Carolina. The marriage
in question was not a common-law marriage or any other kind of mar-
riage because there was no valid consent, and consent, as the court
points out,21 is the first essential to marriage. The defense asserted that
although the ceremonial marriage was a sham, the consent thereto pro-
duced a valid union precluding a conviction for conspiracy to procure
a fraudulent marriage. This approach was evidently on the theory that,
the attempted marriage being invalid, a common-law marriage re-
sulted.22 The court stated generally that "consent" marriages are in-
valid in North Carolina. However, on the facts, a direct and pointed
answer might have been that there was no marriage of any kind because
nobody had consented. The "husbands" consented only to a sham; the
19 See treatment of this case infra, n. 34 and accompanying text.
21 State v. Wilson, 121 N. C. 650, 657, 28 S. E. 416, 418 (1897).2Id. at 656, 28 S. E. at 418.
'Ashley v. State, 109 Ala. 48, 19 So. 917 (1895); Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala.
613, 69 So. 885 (1915) ; and cases cited in 38 C. J. 1320, §95 and notes.
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"wives" consented only to a non-existent ceremonial marriage. Assum-
ing common-law marriages to be invalid, if there had been (by estoppel
or otherwise) 23 a nmutual agreement to marry -which the parties adhered
to despite the non-observance of the required formalities, the prosecu-
tion could have been for lewd conduct.
If State z. Wilson is the authority for the invalidation of common-
law marriage in North Carolina, the above criticism, if well taken,
necessitates an examination of the cases cited by the court to sustain its
decision. The first was State v. Samuel.2 4  There, on an indictment
for murder, the defendant, a slave, had objected to the introduction of
a slave woman as a witness for the state on the ground that she was his
wife and therefore incompetent to testify against him. The Supreme
Court overruled this contention, holding that only a marriage de jure,
not de facto, could work this exclusion. The opinion then continued
with the following discourse on the creation of marriages :25
". .. It has been urged that the essence of this, as of other con-
tracts, consists in the consent of the parties; which if expressed before
any witnesses, in any words, or by any acts, fully denoting present con-
sent, renders the contract obligatory by the law of nature and reason;
and it was thence inferred, that it is necessarily binding in our law, in
the absence of positive provisions to the contrary.
"... We do not agree that persons sui juris are legally married
merely in virtue of their own consent, however explicitly expressed, in
terms of immediate agreement, unless it be so expressed in presence of
those persons who are designated by law to be witnesses thereto . . .
it is plain from the earliest period of our legislation, that in consequence
thereof, it has been constantly required as an essential requisite of a
legal marriage, that it should either be celebrated by some person in a
sacred office, or be entered into before someone in a public station and
judicial trust. The very first chapter found in our oldest statute book,
1715, c. 1, contains such provisions on this subject, as one of vital im-
portance to the prosperity of the young colony. From the terms of that
act, and of those subsequently passed in 1741 and 1778, and the con-
stant usage ever since, the court considers this to be clearly the law in
this state."
It should be noted that the Samuel case concerned an alleged con-
tract of marriage between parties whose status precluded them from
making any contracts of any type.2 6  The court was much concerned
" An ostensibly mutual contract of marriage, valid and sufficient on its face,
cannot be successfully avoided by mental reservations and a secret intention of
one of the parties not to marry. In re Imboden's Estate, 111 Mo. App. 220, 86
S. W. 263 (1905), and authorities cited.
2110 N. C. 177 (1836). 0 Id. at 180.
On the authority of the Samuel case, the court in Doe on demise of Howard
v. Howard et al., 51 N. C. 235, 236 (1858), held that slaves could not enter into
the marriage relation because they had not the legal capacity to make a contract,
Marriage being based on contract, the relation of man and wife was excluded
among slaves, "both on account of their incapacity to contract, and of the para-
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with that phase of the case and dwelt at some length on the unhappy
condition of enslaved persons. The court said that the references in
certain statutes to the "marriage" of slaves meant merely a sort of con-
cubinage, permissive on the part of the master and voluntary on the part
of the slave. However, the court did not hold that the marital contract,
like others, could not be entered into by slaves; it put aside the question
of their right to marry until presented "in a case in which it shall di-
rectly arise."27 However, ability so to contract was assumed for the
purposes of this statement from the opinion :28
". .. Assuming for the occasion, therefore, that marriage is an ex-
ception from the principle on which their contracts generally are deemed
null, and that in law they may marry, yet, in the absence of particular
regulations for the marriage of slaves, to give validity to a marriage con-
tracted by them, it must be such a marriage, as by the general law, is
valid ... "
Here again is an unfortunate case upon which to predicate a rule,
for the court, when it does not agree that persons sid juris are legally
married merely "in virtue of their own consent," is indulging in
dictum.2 '9 No such persons were involved in the case, for slaves were
definitely not sui juris. The statement of the court with reference to
the invalidity of marriages by consent would also appear to be dictum :0
theapparent marital relation existing between slaves was merely a sort
of concubinage allowed by the state and voluntarily entered into by the
mount right of ownership in them, as property." In Spaugh et al. v. Hartman
et al., 150 N. C. 454, 455, 64 S. E. 198, 199 (1909), it was said concerning slave
marriages that while "the marriage of slaves was not recognized as a legal bond,
it is well known that in numberless instances the marriage relation was assumed
by them, and to all intents and purposes, except in law, they became man and
wife, and the appellation of 'husband and wife' was used in reference to the
parties to such unions by their owners and their associates.
"By the common law it is held to be a general rule of universal application
in civil cases, except in actions for criminal conversation, that reputation, co-
habitation, the declarations and conduct of the parties are competent evidence to
prove that the marriage relation subsisted between them....
"We are of opinion that the same rule of evidence should apply in proving
that the quasi marriage relation referred to in the statute existed between
slaves. * . ." [The statute in question (N. C. Pub. Laws 1879, c. 73) added to
the canons of descent by legitimating children of colored parents born at any
time before January 1, 1868, or persons living together as man and wife and
conferring on all such children the rights of heirs at law or next of kin with
respect to the estate of such parents or either of them.] And see Walker et al.
v. Walker et al., 151 N. C. 164, 166, 65 S. E. 923, 924 (1909).
' State v. Samuel, 19 N. C. 177, 182 (1836).
2 Ibid.
'For a definition of dictum in a case involving common-law marriage, see
Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 602, 153 S. W. 1124, 1126, L. R. A. 1915E 8 (1913).
'"In L. R. A. 1915E, it is stated in a footnote at p. 119 that State v. Samuel,
19 N. C. 177 (1836) carefully pointed out that the question of validity of a
marriage not entered into according to statute was not directly involved and
therefore not finally passed on. Despite this, the note continued, State v. Wilson,
121 N. C. 650, 28 S. E. 416 (1897) cited it to the point that there was no such
thing as marriage by mere consent in North Carolina.
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slave if he could get his owner's permission. Obviously it was not a
marriage in any legal sense, for it could be dissolved by the owner at
will and furthermore, a marriage between persons sui jris does not
require the consent of third parties.
State v. Patterson,81 another case relied on in State v. Wilson, was
an indictment for bigamy, the defense being that the alleged bigamous
marriage had not been consummated and, therefore, no crime had been
committed. The testimony was declared wholly irrelevant because :32
". .. Marriage, or the relation of husband and wife, is in law com-
plete, when parties, able to contract and willing to contract, actually
have contracted to be man and wife in the forms and with the solemni-
ties required by law. .. ."
Here is another weak case upon which to found the rule prohibiting
informal marriage. There was no common-law marriage. To the con-
trary, there were two ceremonial marriages. The court simply held that
testimony as to the existence of consummation was of no import because
the fact of marriage -was not dependent upon consummation. Only by
inference does the foregoing statement invalidate the common-law union
in North Carolina. In order to accomplish the latter purpose there must
be read into the statement quoted the word "only" between the words
"complete" and "when".33
The next authority cited in the Wilson case was State v. Bray.3 4
This was another indictment for bigamy, the question being whether
or not there had actually been two marriages. The validity of common-
law marriage in the state was not raised. Upon an appeal from a judg-
ment of conviction, a new trial was awarded in order that a jury might
determine the authority of the minister officiating at the allegedly biga-
mous marriage.3 5 Again we encounter the inferential establishment of
the rule that common-law marriages are invalid. What the case really
involved was two attempted ceremonial marriages. It is cited as an
authority for the proposition that non-ceremonial marriages are invalid
-24 N. C. 346 (1842). -Id. at 355.
" Generally, statutes setting up certain formalities for contracting valid mar-
riages are construed as directory, not mandatory. See note 16, supra.435 N. C. 198 (1852).
The court examined the North Carolina statutes concerning the authority
to perform marriages at some length to ascertain whether or not the marriage
had been perfomed by an authorized person, i.e., "a minister, capable of entering
upon the duties of such a charge, according to the ecclesiastical economy of his
church, with the faculty of celebrating the rites of matrimony:' It was held
necessary for this question to be determined by a jury. In Smith v. North Mem-
phis Savings Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S. W. 392 (1905), the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee quoted and affirmed an earlier case, Bashaw v. State, 1 Yerg. 177 (Tenn.
1829), which declared common-law marriages invalid in that state, and also con-
sidered the North Carolina statutes in an interesting opinion. That consideration
was made apropos because the two states were originally one, North Carolina
ceding Tennessee to the Federal Government in 1789. For a criticism of the
Bashaw decision, see footnote 16 in L. P, A. 1915E 119.
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on the theory that if such marriages had been valid the authority of the
minister at the second marriage would not have been an issue, for the
reason that a bigamous informal marriage would have resulted even
though the formal ceremony failed.36 While this is true, the case still
leaves the North Carolina law without a decision squarely in point as to
the invalidity of common-law marriage.
Several other decisions were relied on in State v. Wilson. Cooke v.
Cooke 37 was similar to the Bray case. A marriage was declared invalid
because the person solemnizing it acted without authority, although it
could be validated by retrospective legislation.38 State v. Parker0 was
also concerned with the legality of an alleged bigamous marriage, and it
was held, following State v. Bray,40 that the validity of the marriage
depended upon the authority of the person performing it, the statute
law set out in the Bray case still continuing in effect, although it had
been somewhat broadened. It should be noted that the court did not
declare that common-law marriages were invalid, but merely said that
the Code, Section 1813, forbade any officer or minister from performing
a marriage without the required license. If such officer or minister was
actually authorized to solemnize marriages, failure to comply with the
licensing requirements subjected him to a penalty, but the marriage was
nevertheless valid. 41 The court pointed out that Section 181242 of the
'See note 22, supra. In the opinion in the Bray case, 35 N. C. at 203, it was
said: "It was not necessary, therefore, to the validity of the marriage that the
witness should appear to have been a minister in charge of a church, or the
rector of a parish, or pastor of a particular flock. But it is necessary that he
should have appeared to be a minister, capable of entering upon the duties of
such a charge, according to the ecclesiastical economy of his church, with the
faculty of celebrating the rites of matrimony."
=61 N. C. 583 (1868).
'The case involved a petition for dower, defendants objecting to petitioner's
recovery -thereof on the theory that the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased was invalid because performed by a justice of the peace appointed by the
Confederate Government after the subjugation of the state by the Union forces.
The court held that the justice of the peace, an official of a defunct government,
had no authority to solemnize a marriage after that subjugation; a marriage so
entered into was invalid but could be validated by retrospective legislation remedy-
ing the original defect in the form of the ceremony to comply with the statute.
The formal defect was the solemnization by a person who was neither a de jure
nor de facto officer of the state. However, the marriage was not a nullity or
void, as shown by the following language (at p. 587): "We are of opinion that
the Convention had power to give validity to this marriage. On this distinction:
If the marriage be a nility for the want of the essence of the matter, that is,
the consent of one of the parties, as in the case of Crump v. Morgan, 3 Ire. Eq.
[38 N. C. 91 (1843)], where, one of the parties being lunatic, the court decreed
a divorce 'of nullity of marriage,'-neither a Convention, nor Legislature, nor any
other authority has power to make the marriage valid; but if the marriage be
invalid by reason of the non-observance of some solemnity which is required
by statute, as the presence of a minister of the gospel or a justice of the peace,
that want of form may be supplied by an ordinance of a Convention. .
s106 N. C. 711, 11 S. E. 517 (1890). '°35 N. C. 198 (1852).
" Section 2498, N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935), is the modern counterpart of
Section 1813. The penalty provision, then in Section 1817, is in Section 2499
of the present code. I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2493.
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Code authorized the solemnization of the ceremony by an ordained min-
ister or a justice of the peace. It was then noted that the statute was
broader than at the time when the decision in the Bray case was ren-
dered. The failure to show that the minister possessed certain qualifi-
cations previously required and which caused the Bray case to be sent
back for a new trial, was declared to be immaterial. If this case is an
authority for the proposition that common-law marriages are invalid,
it is such by inference only.
The last decision cited by the court in the Wilson case was State v.
Melton,43 and again the point in issue was the existence of an allegedly
-bigamous marriage. The court stated that North Carolina, by the stat-
ute of 1866,44 had adopted, with regard to slave marriages, the rule
which had long prevailed in Scotland, and in New York and several
other states, that consent followed by cohabitation constituted a legal
marriage. Far from holding that common-law marriages were invalid,
the case merely decided that concubinage between slaves, ripening into
marriage by virtue of the statute of 1866, created a marriage sufficient
to make any subsequent union bigamous.
Evidently the inference which the court in State v. Wilson drew
from the Melton case was that, since the enactment of the statute of
1866 was necessary to extend the principles of common-law marriage to
informal unions between slaves, there must have been no general recog-
nition of common-law marriage in the state. Had there been such
recognition, the enactment of 1866 would have been superfluous, for
slaves who continued to live as husband and wife could establish a
common-law marriage by reason of their emancipation.
As some doubt has been cast upon the generally accepted rule of
invalidity of common-law marriage in North Carolina, there remains
the task of examining the cases cited as conflicting, or at least as intro-
ducing confusion into the law. One of those doubts is found in the
statement that "North Carolina, in the first instance, declared itself
strongly against informal marriages, by what was conceded to be a
dictum, but later cases are more or less inconsistent with the theory
that such marriages are invalid." 45 The Samuel,46 Cooke47 and Wil-
120 N. C. 591, 26 S. E. 933 (1897).
"N. C. Pub. Laws 1866, c. 40, §5, provides that emancipated slaves who
cohabited in the relation of husband and wife should be deemed lawfully married
as of the time of the commencement of the cohabitation. See N. C. CODE ANN.(Michie, 1935) §2497, State v. Whitford, 86 N. C. 636, 637 (1882).
'L. R. A. 1915E 18, footnote 40. "The Supreme Court of North Carolina in
1836, in a case involving slave marriages, branched out from that precise quesdon
and discussed the matter of common-law marriages, and while pointing out that
the general rule as to consensual marriages was not directly involved and was not,
therefore, to be finally passed upon declared that it did not agree that persons
sui juris were legally married merely in virtue of their own consent, however
exclusively expressed in terms of immediate agreement, unless it was so ex-
pressed in the presence of those persons who were designated by law to be wit-
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son48 cases were noted as sustaining the rule, but it was asserted in this
statement that Jones, et al. v. Reddick, et al.,49 took for granted that
the "common law prevailed". Another intimation that the law was not
as clear as could be desired is found in a note ° which, although listing
North Carolina as one of the states not recognizing this type of union,
added "But see Jones v. Reddick...."
The Jones case was, indeed, one which might give rise to confusion.
The action was for the recovery of land, the plaintiffs' right thereto de-
pending upon whether or not they were the lawful children of A. E.
Jones, son of F. Jones, the testator. At the trial, E. T. Jones testified
that he visited A. E. Jones, who was his 'brother, in Savannah, Georgia,
during the Civil War, and that his brother was then married and had
three children. The witness had no personal knowledge of the mar-
riage, but testified that Sarah, the woman in question, conducted herself
as a wife and was regarded as such in the home. A deposition of an-
other witness was introduced to the effect that the plaintiffs were the
children of A. E. Jones and Sarah, his wife. There was also in evidence
a certified copy of a marriage license and a certificate of marriage signed
by the minister who had performed the ceremony. The defendant re-
quested the court to instruct that this evidence was insufficient to war-
rant a finding that A. E. Jones had been legally married and that the
plaintiffs were his children. The request was refused and a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiffs followed, from which the defendants ap-
pealed.
In the opinion rendered on appeal, the Supreme Court said :51
"No actual marriage was shown, nor was it shown, or offered to be
shown, what would constitute a valid marriage by the laws of Georgia,
where the marriage was alleged to have been celebrated. But in all
Christian States, especially in the States of the American Union, which,
although in some respects foreign to each other, have a common origin,
and in other respects, a constitutional community of rights and interests,
it is presumed that the common law prevails, and that the same proofs
which are sufficient to establish the fact of marriage in one State, will
be likewise sufficient to establish the same fact in another State ...
"By the common law it is held to be a general rule, of universal ap-
plication in civil causes, except in actions for criminal conversation, that
nesses thereto." Citing State v. Samuel, 19 N. C. 177 (1836). In a footnote at p.
35, it was said that although the validity of common-law marriage had been doubted
in North Carolina, ". . . it was summarily declared in other cases that evi-
dence of cohabitation, reputation, etc., was competent to establish marriage except
in actions of crim. con. ... In Jones v. Reddick . . . such evidence was held ad-
missible apparently upon the theory that the common law was in force, and neces-
sarly so in order to render such evidence competent."
"State v. Samuel, 19 N. C. 177 (1836).
'
1 Cooke v. Cooke, 61 N. C. 583 (1868).
" State v. Wilson, 121 N. C. 650, 28 S. E. 416 (1897).
"79 N. C. 290 (1878).
- (1925) 39 A. L. R. 551. "79 N. C. 290, 292 (1878).
COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
reputation, cohabitation, the declarations and conduct of the parties, are
competent evidence of marriage between them ...
"As such evidence would have been competent to establish marriage
in this State by the common law, by the same law it must be held to be
competent to establish, that the parties were legally married according
to the laws of Georgia. There was not only sufficient, but plenary evi-
dence of the marriage." (Italics supplied.)
The Jones case seems to be one of a line of decisions which have not
added to the clarity of the North Carolina law on this subject.52 The
earliest of these decisions is Whitehead (Widow) v. Clinch.53 There
the plaintiff petitioned for dower54 and, concerning the proof by which
she sought to establish her marriage to the deceased, it was said:
"... the Court permitted oral evidence to be given of cohabitation
in proof of the marriage, notwithstanding ttW English authorities re-
quire a certificate of the bishop, because there is no record kept here of
marriages, as in England there is; consequently, no certificate of any
officer can be had, and unless parol evidence be received we shall in-
validate all the marriages in the country."
Another early case, decided in 1799, was Felts and wife v. Mary
Foster et al.55 The plaintiffs were entitled by the will of one Foster,
deceased, to a considerable part of his property in the event of a re-
marriage by his widow, one of the defendants. In the plaintiffs' bill,
the charge was made that the widow actually had married the other de-
fendant, but the alleged husband and wife severally denied this by their
answers. Despite this denial, the jury found that the parties were mar-
ried. On appeal, the Supreme Court rendered this opinion:56
"The answers of the defendants ought to be read to the jury and by
them considered. There is in this case no positive proof of a marriage,
but there are circumstances advancing to create a belief that a marriage
has taken place: they have lived together a long time, as man and wife,
have had several children, and the witnesses say that she was a woman
of irreproachable character, before these things happened. If so, a pre-
sumption arises that she would not thus have cohabited with the de-
fendant, unless a marriage had been previously solemnized. Upon such
evidence, I think the jury may find a marriage." (Italics supplied.)
The decision is an unusual one. Not only was positive proof of the
marriage entirely lacking, but there was a positive denial by both of the
defendants that they had intermarried. To sustain the alleged union
and offset that denial there were only circumstances evidencing a habit
and repute of marriage and yet the court was able to conclude that the
See note 50, supra, and accompanying text.
"3 N. C. 3 (1797).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1784, c. 22, §9.
1 N. C. 164 (1799).
'Id. at 73. The quotation is of the entire opinion.
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jury might reasonably find a marriage.57 Mere "circumstantial advanc-
ing to create a belief", and not positive proof, were sufficient to prove a
marriage against the denials of those who of all persons should have
known whether or not there had been a ceremony-the parties them-
selves. Implied contracts of marriage have been established by cir-
cumstances similar to those present in this case in states recognizing
common-law marriages, 58 but rarely has a court gone so far as to uphold
an inference of a ceremony despite the denials of the persons allegedly
parties thereto.
Weaver v. Cryer & Moore59 continued the line. The action was
trover for certain cattle, the plaintiff proving that the animals were
levied on as the property of Bridget Weaver by the defendant Moore,
a constable, and bought by the defendant Cryer, and that Bridget
Weaver had sold them 'to the plaintiff before the levy. At the sale, a
woman who lived with the plaintiff claimed the cattle by gift from
Bridget Weaver. Plaintiff, who was present when this claim was made,
said nothing, but did prove at the trial that it was generally reputed that
the woman who lived with him was his wife, she being white and he a
mulatto.
The defense requested the court to instruct that common reputation
would not be evidence of a marriage between a mulatto and a white
woman, as the policy of the country forbade such connections. The
request was declined and the jury informed that they were at liberty to
infer a marriage from reputation and cohabitation. In the opinion by
the Supreme Court it was said:
". .. The opinion [of the court below] affirms two propositions ....
The other is, that a marriage between a mulatto and a white woman,
may be proved 'by common reputation. .... 0
". .. On the question of Evidence, I apprehend that the law was cor-
rectly stated-that general reputation and cohabitation, are evidence of
a marriage; it is so in all cases, except in acti6ns for crim. con." 01
Thirty-two years later Archer v. Haithcock 2 was decided. The case
was an action of ejectment, the only question raised being the suffi-
ciency of a deed from one Avy Hood to the defendant. It was conceded
that unless the deed was good the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.
'
T his conclusion necessitated some devious reasoning: the character of the
woman was so irreproachable as to preclude any possibility of her engaging in an
illicit relationship, therefore she must have been married. But that same character
was so base and devoid of the elementary attributes of honor that the court could
find that she would not hesitate to deceive it and the jury by false answers,
therefore she was lying when she said she was unmarried.
t'See note 13, supra.
12 N. C. 337 (1827). MId. at 339.
eId. at 341 (the case was reversed on other grounds). "Crim. con." is, of
course, an abbreviation of criminal conversation.
151 N. C. 421 (1859).
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The right to the estate covered by the deed was in Avy Hood at the
time when she intermarried formally, under license and before witnesses
with James Hood. Avy and James Hood made the deed as husband and
wife, but it was not authenticated by separate examination of the woman
apart from her husband, as required by law. The defendant insisted
that it was legally sufficient despite this failure because Avy's marriage
to Hood was invalid, he being at that time already married to another.
Consequently, it was alleged that the woman's deed was good as that of
a feme sole, even though executed by her in her married name.
The evidence showed that James Hood had lived with one Grace
Patterson, that they had several children, and were reputed to be hus-
band and wife. The lower court charged the jury that "'where a man
and woman lived together, and passed and were recognized as man and
wife, it was evidence, to submit to them, of a marriage,'" and that if
there was such a marriage, Hood's later union with Avy Johnson while
Grace Patterson was alive was void, and Avy Johnson's deed was valid.
There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant and the plaintiffs
appealed. In the opinion rendered by the Supreme Court it was said :63
".. . the jury, by their verdict, say they were satisfied that the said
Hood and Grace Patterson had been married.
"There was direct evidence of the solemnization of a marriage be-
tween Hood and Avy Johnson, and the question is, does this direct evi-
dence of one marriage exclude and render incompetent, or insufficient
in law, the circumstantial evidence upon which the jury have found the
former marriage?
"It is held to be a general rule that reputation, cohabitation, and the
declaration and conduct of the parties,.are competent evidence of a mar-
riage between them, except in two cases, i.e., on an indictment for
bigamy and in an action of 'crim. con.' . . .. But these two exceptions
are fixed and, stare decisis. We are not, however, disposed to make an-
other exception without a reason. Especially, as, in this State, there is
no registry of marriages, and frequently, circumstantial evidence is the
only mode of proving one."
In 1860, the Supreme Court decided Jackson, et al. v. Rhem, et al.,64
which arose out of a petition for a distributive share of the estate of
Edward Rhem, intestate. The petition alleged that Rhem left no chil-
dren but was survived by a brother and a large number of nephews
and nieces, including the plaintiffs. The defendants denied the right of
the plaintiffs to share in the estate, alleging them to be the illegitimate
offspring of the intestate's deceased brother.
The testimony showed that the deceased brother and the mother of
the alleged illegitimates had lived together for twenty years as husband
and wife, enjoying the reputation of being married during that time,
11 Id. at 422. ", 59 N. C. 141 (1860).
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although there was no evidence that they actually had been married.
Other evidence consisted of a marriage bond reciting the securing of a
license by the deceased brother to marry the mother of the plaintiffs and
the testimony of several witnesses that they had heard the deceased say
on several occasions, both before and after the reputed wife's death, that
he had never married her. One of the issues submitted to the jury
was whether or not the couple were ever "lawfully married". There
was a verdict for the plaintiffs and the case was removed to the Su-
preme Court, which held :65
".. . We are of opinion that when a man and woman have lived to-
gether for many years, treating each other as man and wife, and have
been so reputed to be in the neighborhood where they lived, during all
the time, in which they thus cohabited; and where they have had chil-
dren, which were treated by the parents as legitimate, up to the time of
the death of the latter, we think that the testimony, which should induce
a court to declare against the marriage of the parties, and thereby to
bastardize their issue after their deaths, ought to be so overwhelming
as to leave not a doubt about the facts thus declared. It was a well
known rule of the ecclesiastical law, that if two persons, who labored
under canonical disabilities intermarried with each other, the marriage
could not be declared to have been void after the death of both, or either
of the parties. That rule does not prevail in our law, because we do
not recognize the ecclesiastical as part of our common law of mar-
riage. ...
The next decision, Ferrall et al. v. Broadway,6" was rendered in
1886. The case originated in a proceeding for partition in which the
sole issue was the legitimacy of certain claimants of lands left by an
intestate. The alleged marriage was sought to be established by con-
flicting circumstantial evidence, all of which was of the character gen-
erally relied on to prove common-law marriages.67 In the words of the
"Id. at 143.
"195 N. C. 551 (1886). The verdict in the lower court was set aside and an
order for a venire de novo granted because of an erroneous instruction to the
jury.
The opinion stated (at p. 553) that "There was no direct evidence of an actual
marriage, no witness being produced who was present when the ceremony was
performed, and no evidence found of the issue of a marriage license authorizing
it. The nearest approximation to such proof, is the intestate's declaration one
Sunday evening, that he was going off to be married, and his going off and
returning with the said Elizabeth, but he did not then say he had been married,
and there was evidence of his having been seen going in a different direction from
that leading to the county to which he had said he was going.
"The evidence consisted in declarations of the intestate, wholly irreconcilable,
as to his marriage-his recognition of the paternity of the children-the internal
domestic management of affairs, as if the parties were husband and wife, and
general reputation, was in conflict. There was produced an entry in the family
Bible, written by the intestate, of the births of the three younger children, each
of whom is described as the child 'of J. W. Broadway and Elizabeth, his wife,'
and the date of their respective births given.
"The witnesses to the general reputation and to the declaration of the intestate,
were numerous, and their testimony entirely different, except as to the earlier
270
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court, "there was no direct evidence of an actual marriage", but the jury
found that one existed on evidence of a habit and repute of marriage.
There was nothing in the case to indicate that the marriage sought to
be proved was other than a ceremonial marriage.
In Forbes et al. v. Burgess,68 in the absence of direct evidence, a
ceremonial marriage 9 was established by general reputation, statements
of the alleged husband, and the action of the parties in recognizing their
relation as that of man and wife.
It has been noted7" that in State v. Wilson"T the repudiation of con-
sent marriages was categorically stated and supported by the Samuel,7 2
Patterson,73 Bray,74 and Cooke7 5 cases. Those decisions were cited as
definitely establishing the invalidity of consent marriages, a doctrine
which the court said was recognized in the later Parker76 and Melton77
cases. If they are conclusive, that very fact makes an opinion rendered
thirty-four years after the Samuel case and twenty-eight, eighteen, and
two years after the Patterson, Bray, and Cooke cases, respectively, even
harder to explain. That opinion was handed down in State v. Ta-cha-
na-tah.78 The case was an indictment for murder and at the trial a wit-
ness offered by the defendant, an Indian, was rejected, upon objection
by the state, because she was allegedly the defendant's wife. It was ad-
mitted by the prosecution that the rites of matrimony had not been per-
formed between the two according to the laws of North Carolina or in
any other form. The asserted relation was sanctioned only by tribal
custom, and consisted of cohabitation as man and wife and a recognition
of the parties as such by other members of the tribe. However, the
relation could be dissolved at pleasure, the couple then being free to
marry again. It was held that this arrangement was not such as would.
work a disqualification of the witness on the ground that she was the
defendant's wife. Concerning the alleged marriage on which the ob-
jection was based the court said :9
"There is but one law of marriage in this State, which applies equally
to all citizens. Our law regards marriage only as a civil contract. Every
period of the intercourse, when there is a general concurrence as to its unlaw-
fulness."
158 N. C. 131, 73 S. E. 792 (1912).
One of the charges given by the lower court and quoted in the opinion (158
N. C. 131, 133, 73 S. E. 792) was premised on the finding by the jury of "a
lawful ceremony of marriage".
See note 24, supra, and accompanying text.
121 N. C. 650, 28 S. E. 416 (1897).
"State v. Samuel, 19 N. C. 177 (1836).
' State v. Patterson, 24 N. C. 346 (1842).
'State v. Bray, 35 N. C. 198 (1852).
" Cooke v. Cooke, 61 N. C. 583 (1868).
' State v. Parker, 106 N. C. 711, 11 S. E. 517 (1890).
-State v. Melton, 120 N. C. 591, 26 S. E. 933 (1897).
'64 N. C. 614 (1870). "Id. at 616.
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one is at liberty to superadd to that whatever sanctities his religion may
require. Even if it be true, that by the law of North Carolina, a mar-
riage per verba de presenti followed by cohabitation, but without any
form of ceremony whatever, is to be deemed valid, (as to which we
express no opinion,) yet it can never be held that mere cohabitation,
with an understanding that it may cease at pleasure, can constitute a
marriage, or carry with it the rights and disabilities of that relation ......
This language of the North Carolina Supreme Court indicates that
the doubt cast upon the finality of the non-recognition of common-law
marriages by some commentators was not theirs alone. However, one
salient fact is common to all the other cases of this second group-they
are directed to a question of evidence, i.e., what circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to prove a marriage in the absence of direct evidence? The
substantive law of informal marriage is not involved.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that the two lines of North Carolina decisions
touching common-law marriage concern that subject only incidentally.
Despite this failure, the theory of invalidity of informal marriages in
North Carolina receives support of an affirmative and negative character
from both lines of cases.
The best affirmative assertion of the non-recognition of common-law
marriage is found in the State v'. Samuel line-not, however, in the
dicta of the Samuel and Wilson cases or the bare statement of State v.
Patterson, but in the inferences of the Bray, Cooke, and Parker cases.
The last three would have been decided the other way if common-law
unions had been valid-the first three would not. And the accepted rule
of invalidity may be negatively supported: there are no decisions to the
contrary. If this statement is true we must reconcile it with the asser-
tions that the cases appear to be in conflict.8 0
In the first place, the common law, where not abrogated, repealed,
or obsolete, is still in force in North Carolina.81 Secondly, the cases
state that North Carolina has prescribed a statutory method of con-
tracting marriage.8 2 An assumption that this prescription abrogates
common-law marriage is consistent with the cases, whereas a contrary
assumption is not, because the decisions treat the statute as mandatory.
However, it does not follow that the whole body of the common law
has been discarded. It is only the substantive common law which has
been abrogated-the evidentiary common law has been retained. The
plausibility of this explanation is thus indicated by one of the commenta-
tors who asserts that a confusion exists in the North Carolina decisions:
' See notes 45, 50, supra, and accompanying text.
IN. C. CoD ANN. (Michie, 1935) §970.
State v. Samuel, 19 N. C. 177, 180, 181 (1836) ; State v. Bray, 35 N. C. 289.
296 (1852) ; State v. Wilson, 121 N. C. 650, 656, 28 S. E. 416, 418 (1897).
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"The absolute dissociation of the evidential theory of habit and repute
from the substantive doctrine of marriage in fact is most forcibly illus-
trated by the fact that habit and repute are received as evidence of mar-
riage even where the substantive common law has been rejected by the
courts or abrogated by statute.' ' 3
This dissociation is the key to the distinction between State v: Wil-
son and its predecessors and the Jones v. Reddick line. The latter cases
were addressed to questions of evidence, that is, the proof of marriage
and not the fact of marriage.8 4 The evidehce of declarations, conduct,
reputation, and cohabitation were admitted to prove a ceremonial, not a
common-law marriage. Although these types of evidence are generally
associated with common-law unions, they also may be used to prove
ceremonial marriages.8 5 Resort to this kind of evidence has been neces-
sary in North Carolina because of the lack of direct evidence of cere-
monial marriages, a lack so pronounced in the past that it merited com-
ment by the supreme court 8 6 And in some of the cases of the Jones v.
Reddick line, the recognition of the provability of ceremonial marriages
by circumstantial evidence has been complete.8 7
In the opinion of the writer, the Social Security Board must come
to these conclusions: Common law marriage is not valid in North.
Carolina. Therefore, the mutual consent to be man and wife, the habit
and repute of marriage which would be received in other jurisdictions
to establish common-law marriages, cannot be received for that pur-
pose in North Carolina. But the cases show that the abrogation of
the common law in North Carolina as to the fact of marriage has not
similarly abrogated the common law as to the proof of marriage. There-
fore, the Board may accept, in proof of ceremonial marriages in this
I' Note L. R. A. 1915E 47. The statement quoted would seem to be an ade-
quate answer to the point made in the footnote at page 35 of this same volume,
quoted in note 45, supra.
"Weaver v. Cryer & Moore, 12 N. C. 337' (1827); Jackson, et at. v. Rhem.
et al., 59 N. C. 141 (1860); Jones, et al. v. Reddick, et at., 79 N. C. 290 1878);
Ferrall v. Broadway, 95 N. C. 551 (1886);'Forbes, et al. v. Burgess, 158 N. C.
131, 73 S. E. 792 (1912). As shown by the quotations in the text, the references
in these opinions were always to the evidence acceptable for the establishment of a
marriage.
1 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§2082, 2083. However, the inference of
a ceremonial marriage from such circumstances "will not be so readily drawn
unless some satisfactory explanation can be given of the absence of that eye-
witness evidence which ought ordinarily to be available if in truth there was a
ceremonial marriage,.-for example, the certificate or the register." Id. §2082.
91". ..in this State, there is no registry of marriages, and frequently, cir-
cumstantial evidence is the only mode of proving one." Archer v. Haithcock,
51 N. C. 421, 423 (1859).
1 Felts and wife v. Foster, et a., 1 N. C. 164 (1799). In Forbes, et al. v.
Burgess, 158 N. C. 131, 133, 73 S. E. 792 (1912), the court stated that no direct
evidence of the performance of the marriage ceremony had been adduced. The
proof offered in the lower court was entirely circumstantial, yet the charge to thejury referred only to the "lawful ceremony of marriage" which the jury might
find to exist.
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state, the same evidence which it accepts to prove common-law mar-
riages in other states.
With these principles in mind, let us observe the manner in which
they are applied. The best illustrations of the operations of the Social
Security Board with regard to claims based upon the common-law mar-
riage relation are found in the files of such cases. For the purposes of
comparison it will be helpful to consider briefly typical cases arising
in jurisdictions which recognize common-law marriage, as well as cases
arising in North Carolina which does not.88
In those jurisdictions adhering to the view that common-law mar-
riages may be established by proof of the contract alone, or 'by proof
from which such a contract may be implied, the Board .builds up in
its files evidence in the form of affidavits sufficient to establish the
required facts. These files constitute an interesting commentary on the
nature of common-law marriage: In no claim thus far in any juris-
diction has such a marriage been substantiated by direct proof of a
marital contract, either written or oral. Consequently, in all cases the
Board has accepted evidence of the habit and repute of marriage to
establish the informal union. The files show that this evidence has not
been sensational in character. Husbands "just disappear" and after
intervals of varying lengths, the deserted spouses, according to their
affidavits, "just began living with" someone else. Affidavits of the
neighbors frequently establish the required habit and repute of mar-
riage. The neighbors appear merely as the people next door or around
the corner who visited the common-law spouses in their home, heard
them refer to and introduce each other as husband and wife, and never
suspected the existence of an irregular relation. Thus far there have
been no cases involving conflicting testimony or reputation, possibly
due to the small amounts involved and the fact that the unions, though
irregular, were boa fide.
Let us consider some typical cases involving benefit payments of
less than five hundred dollars. The decisions of State X validate
common-law marriages rested on a mutual consent to be husband and
wife, without requiring a subsequent cohabitation in the marital rela-
tion. A, an employee in a covered occupation, dies and B, the woman
who lives with him, files a claim for a lump-sum death benefit. There
was no express marital contract, but in her affidavit B states that she
and A had lived together as husband and wife, that he had held her out
as being his wife, and that she was recognized as such by their friends
and relatives. Two other persons made affidavit that they knew the
couple as husband and wife and that they were accepted as such in the
" For obvious reasons, names and other identifying facts are omitted from the
illustrative cases discussed.
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community. There 'being no other applicants for the benefit and the
descent and distribution laws of State X permitting payment to the
wife, the Board certified direct payment to B, the widow. Another
case arose in State Y, where common-law marriages were recognized as
valid only when followed by cohabitation in the marital relation. B,
claiming as the common-law wife of A, a deceased employee formerly
working in a covered occupation, was unable to prove an express con-
tract of marriage. However, she did state that the deceased introduced
her as his wife, that she held herself out as his wife and was recog-
nized as such by their mutual friends, relatives, and all others with
whom they associated. She produced affidavits from two disinterested
parties substantiating her statements. Both affidavits set out that the
parties were generally known and accepted in the community as husband
and wife. There being no conflicting claims and the descent and dis-
tribution laws of State Y permitting payment to the widow, the Social
Security Board certified direct payment to B, as the widow of A.
In both these cases, although the express contract of marriage was
absent, the circumstances proved were adjudged sufficient to establish
the fact that at one time or another during the period of cohabitation
the parties had impliedly consented and agreed to be man and wife,
and to live together in that relation.
By contrast we have this situation in North Carolina: When an
applicant files a claim which is predicated on the existence of an asserted
common-law marriage contracted within the state, the claimant is im-
mediately discouraged 'by the field office from proceeding with his or
her application. This discouragement is undertaken on the authority
of a memorandum from the office of the General Counsel declaring that
North Carolina does not recognize common-law marriage. The memo-
randum itself is based on the cases above discussed. Of course, if the
applicant insists upon filing his or her claim, and requests an actual
adjudication, it will eventually reach the office of the General Counsel
for an opinion directed to its specific facts. Thus far no such claim
has been received, presumably because applicants have -been satisfied
with the decisions made in the field.
The other half of the North Carolina situation would be presented
by these facts: A, claiming as the spouse of B, a deceased employee,
asserts that she is his widow by a legal marriage and is therefore entitled
to a death 'benefit. In the absence of contest 'by other claimants, the
widow's own affidavit as to the marriage is accepted as sufficient proof
thereof. However, the Social Security Board has received no claims
from North Carolina in which the assertions of marriage 'by an alleged
spouse have been controverted by other claimants.
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It is reasonable to believe that the future will produce North Caro-
lina claims in which the relationship of husband and wife asserted by
one claimant is contradicted -by another. In such cases the Board would
receive from the claimant spouse the proofs ordinarily accepted to
establish marriage-the marriage certificate, the license, the register,
and affidavits of the witnesses who were present at the ceremony. Up
to this point, the problem of proof of a ceremonial marriage in North
Carolina has nothing in common with the problem of proof of a com-
mon-law marriage in other states. But the difficulty faced in common-
law jurisdictions in establishing informal marriages will manifest itself
in North Carolina in the case of a controverted claim by a spouse who
cannot prove his or her relationship by direct evidence of the type above
referred to. That this situation is possible is indicated by the language
of some of the cases previously discussed. Therefore in establishing
such claims, on the authority of the North Carolina decisions herein
studied, the Board will receive in proof of the disputed ceremonial union
that circumstantial evidence which is ordinarily associated with proof
of the common-law relationship. The same types of evidence which
claimants in other states are now using to prove common-law mar-
riages will appear in the files of North Carolina claims to prove cere-
monial unions. The reputation of the parties in the community, their
cohabitation in the marital relation, their declarations, conduct and
statements, their attitude toward their relation-all the circumstances
which make up the habit and repute of marriage may then be made the
subject of affidavits whose purpose is to establish a formal marriage
by ceremony.
It is believed that only a very few cases will arise in which the evi-
dence presented to the Board will not be sufficient to determine con-
clusively the rights of all applicants. However, in any case where there
is a serious dispute as to the existence of a marital relationship, the
claimants are protected by the provisions of the act which make op-
tional with the Board the matter of direct payments in all cases involv-
ing benefits of five hundred dollars or less.
